Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech - Dismissal of Teacher Who Published Letter Critical of School Officials within Power of School Board by Hoffman, Edward A.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 44 Issue 2 Article 17 
October 1967 
Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech - Dismissal of Teacher 
Who Published Letter Critical of School Officials within Power of 
School Board 
Edward A. Hoffman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward A. Hoffman, Constitutional Law - Freedom of Speech - Dismissal of Teacher Who Published Letter 
Critical of School Officials within Power of School Board , 44 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 194 (1967). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol44/iss2/17 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
action evidenced an intention to abide by the will. While this line of
reasoning may be sound where circumstances remain constant, it is fal-
lacious where the testator married and is aware of statutory provisions
revoking the will. The more logical assumption is that upon learning of
the revocation of the will, the testator relied on intestate succession.
The court's decision can best be considered as an advocation of the
principle that a testator acts in light of knowledge of both the law then in
effect, and the important circumstances which he foresees. Certainly, this
guarantees the certainty under which the testator believed he drafted his
will and rejects the theory that renders a will an amorphous entity sus-
ceptible to future fluctuations.
CHARLES W. STAUDENMAYER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-DISMISSAL OF TEACHER
WHO PUBLISHED LETTER CRITICAL OF SCHOOL OFFICIALS WITHIN POWER OF
SCHOOL BOARD.-In the recent case of Pickering v. Board of Education, 36
Ill. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967), the Supreme Court of Illinois was confronted
with the issue of whether a local Board of Education must continue to
employ a teacher who published in a local newspaper misleading and un-
true statements which reflected upon the credibility and sincerity of his
superintendent and Board and which were reasonably believed to be detri-
mental to the best interests of the school. The court held that apart from
whatever freedom a private individual might possess to harm school ad-
ministrators by misuse of speech, the special position which the teacher
occupies in relation thereto dictates that he be no more privileged to injure
his school by speech than by immorality, brutality, incompetence, or other
conduct. Consequently, such behavior furnishes cause for dismissal, in the
absence of a showing that the Board acted capriciously, arbitrarily, or
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Marvin Pickering was a teacher in Township High School District 205,
Will County. In February and December of 1961, school bond issue pro-
posals were submitted to the voters of the school district. The February
proposal was defeated; the December proposal was approved. In 1964,
proposals to increase the educational and transportation tax rates were twice
rejected. Five days after the second defeat, a local newspaper published a
letter written by Pickering to the editor of the paper. The letter consisted
of a series of complaints which its author had against the district school
superintendent and Board of Education. Pickering charged that funds pro-
cured through the referendum in December of 1961 had been used to con-
struct athletic fields and an auditorium in two local high schools although
the Board had promised that no money would be expended for such
facilities. He further alleged that school lunch prices were unnecessarily
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high because free lunches were supplied to athletes on days of athletic
contests; that $200,000 per year was spent on varsity sports while the needs
of teachers were suffering; that football fields were being sodded on bor-
rowed money while teachers' salaries could not be met; that the Board was
"trying to push tax-supported athletics down our throats with education";
and that the teachers at the high school lived in a "kind of totalitarianism,"
exemplified by the fact that letters previously published by teachers in the
newspaper were required to have the approval of the superintendent.
Following publication of the letter, the Board of Education dismissed
Pickering in accordance with the procedures provided by the School Code
of Illinois' on grounds that the interests of the schools required such action.
2
Desiring reinstatement, Pickering sought review of the Board's decision
in the Circuit Court of Will County.3 On review the Circuit Court affirmed
the Board's ruling. Pickering appealed directly to the Supreme Court of
Illinois, claiming that a constitutional question was involved.4
The evidence presented revealed that many of the statements and
accusations in the Pickering letter could reasonably have been found to be
misleading or altogether untrue. It was also shown that the disgruntled
teacher had never presented any of the charges to his superiors prior to
publication of the letter.
Section 24-11 of the School Code of Illinois5 provides:
Any teacher who has been employed in any district as a full-
time teacher for a probationary period of 2 consecutive school
terms shall enter upon contractual continued service unless given
written notice of dismissal stating the specific reason therefore, by
registered mail by the employing board at least 60 days before the
end of such period. 6
This provision, as well as the entire School Code, was adopted in an effort
to give the teacher more security in his job. Secion 24-12, for example,
establishes a well-defined procedure to be followed in cases where school
boards seek to dismiss a teacher.7
Although the School Code does lend more stability to teaching posi-
1 Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1965).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1965), provides that the school board shall have
the power "to dismiss a teacher for incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality or
other sufficient cause and to dismiss any teacher, whenever, in its opinion, he is not quali-
fied to teach, or whenever, in its opinion, the interests of the schools require it . . ."
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 24-16 (1965), provides that decisions of school boards are
subject to judicial review in accordance with the procedures of the "Administrative Re-
view Act of May 8, 1945."
4 Ill. Const. art. VI, § 5 (1870), provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court in
cases arising under the Constitution of the United States or of the state.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122 (1965).
6 I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1965).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1965).
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tions, it also enables school boards to dismiss teachers in appropriate cases.
Section 10-22.4 provides that the school board shall have the power:
to dismiss a teacher for incompetency, cruelty, negligence, im-
morality or other sufficient cause and to dismiss any teacher, when-
ever, in its opinion, he is not qualified to teach, or whenever, in
its opinion, the interests of the schools require it. .... 8
Thus, it is clearly seen that competency or the lack thereof is not the sole
criterion of a teacher's qualification to teach. In this respect, the School
Code is in accord with the rules adopted in other states which have ad-
vanced various grounds in justification of teacher dismissals. Some of the
more common grounds for dismissal, in addition to incompetency, have
been insubordination, 9 immorality,10 mistreatment of pupils," unseemly
conduct, 12 and the marriage of a female teacher."3
The Illinois case law in this area reveals that wide latitude is allowed
school boards in deciding whether or not a teacher should be dismissed. In
Meridith v. Board of Education,14 a teacher in the agricultural department
of the school district challenged his dismissal by the defendant Board. The
Board charged that Meridith's involvement in his private grain enterprise
had progressed to such an extent as to interfere with the performance of his
teaching duties. The Appellate Court upheld the dismissal, stating:
The best interests of the schools of the district is the guiding
star of the Board of Education and for the courts to interfere with
the exercise of the powers of the Board in that respect is unwar-
ranted assumption of authority and can only be justified in cases
where the Board has acted maliciously, capriciously, and arbitrar-
ily.'5
In Jepsen v. Board of Education,'6 a teacher and ex-football coach was
dismissed, in part because he had on more than one occasion told adminis-
trators and teachers from other schools that an allegedly ineligible football
player at the high school where Jepsen taught had actively participated in
football games, even though the school coach and principal were aware of
his ineligibility. Prior to this disclosure, Jepsen had never protested the
situation to his superiors. Once again the Appellate Court affirmed the
dismissal because no malice, compulsiveness, or capriciousness on the part
of the Board had been shown.' 7
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1965).
9 Board of Education of Los Angeles v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953);
Appeal of Ganaposki, 332 Pa. 550, 2 A.2d 742 (1938).
10 In re Flannery Appeal, 406 Pa. 515, 178 A.2d 751 (1962).
11 Johnson v. Jackson, 42 Tenn. App. 296, 302 S.W.2d 355 (1956).
12 State v. Board of School Directors, 14 Wis. 2d 243, 111 N.W.2d 198 (1961).
13 Houghton v. School Committee of Somerville, 306 Mass. 542,. 28 N.E.2d 1001 (1940).
14 7 Ill. App. 2d 477, 130 N.E.2d 5 (3d Dist. 1955).
15 Id. at 486, 130 N.E.2d at 10.
16 19 Ill. App. 2d 204, 153 N.E.2d 417 (2d Dist. 1958).
17 Id. at 211, 153 N.E.2d at 420.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
In Keyes v. Board of Education,'8 a school superintendent was dis-
missed because for a period of years he had been a center of controversy in
the district due to his constant imbroglios with the Board. The court upheld
the dismissal, stating that the wisdom of the Board's decision was not to
be considered by the court and that the scope of review was limited to
determining whether that decision was supported by the evidence. 19 Dis-
cretionary power was vested in the Board and the court was not authorized
to interfere with the exercise of such power unless the determination upon
which it rested was manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.20
In the instant case, however, Pickering raised a point which had there-
tofore not been considered in the earlier decisions. He contended that his
comments in the newspaper were protected by the right of free speech. In
support of reversal of the judgments of the Board and Circuit Court he
relied mainly on two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
namely, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2l and Garrison v. Louisiana.22
The New York Times case involved a civil libel suit initiated by a
commissioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, against the defendant
newspaper and certain persons whose names appeared in an advertisement
published therein. The Court in that case held that in order for a civil
libel suit instituted by a public official for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct to be actionable, it must be shown that the defama-
tory statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."23
The Garrison case involved a criminal defamation proceeding against
the District Attorney of Orleans Parish, Louisiana, following remarks which
he made at a press conference disparaging the judicial conduct of eight
local criminal court judges. The Court held that in a criminal defamation
action it must be proven not only that the alleged defamatory statement is
untrue, but also that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was true or false.2 4
Applying the logic of these two cases to his own case, Pickering argued
that since his accusations were not "knowing" or "reckless" falsehoods, the
Board lacked authority to dismiss him. In disposing of Pickering's conten-
tion, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that the New York Times and
Garrison cases could be distinguished from the instant case.25 In New York
Times no right of employment was involved. Moreover, the school officials
in the case at bar were not seeking damages for libel. Regarding Garrison,
18 20 Ill. App. 2d 504, 156 N.E.2d 763 (3d Dist. 1959).
19 Id. at 514, 156 N.E.2d at 768.
20 Ibid.
21 376 U.S. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964).
22 379 U.S. 64, 85 Sup. Ct. 209 (1964).
23 Supra note 21, at 279-80, 84 Sup. Ct. at 726.
24 Supra note 22, at 73, 85 Sup. Ct. at 215.
25 36 Ill. 2d 568, 576-577, 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1967).
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the court stated that the issue in the present case was not whether the Board
and superintendent might be subjected to false accusations, but whether the
Board must continue to employ one who publishes misleading and untrue
statements reasonably believed to be detrimental to the schools.
Noting the particular status of Pickering as a teacher, the court
commented:
Whatever freedom a private critic might have to harm others
by the use or misuse of speech, the plaintiff here is not a mere
member of the public. He holds a position as a teacher and is no
more entitled to harm the schools by speech than by incompetency,
cruelty, negligence, immorality, or any other conduct for which
there may be no legal sanction. By choosing to teach in the public
schools, plaintiff undertook the obligation to refrain from conduct
which in the absence of such position he would have an undoubted
right to engage in. While tenure provisions of the School Code
protect teachers in their positions from political or arbitrary inter-
ference, they are not intended to preclude dismissal where the con-
duct is detrimental to the efficient operation and administration
of the schools of the district.
26
Upon examining the facts in the case, the court upheld the decision of
the Board and Circuit Court, stating:
The administration of the schools is within the domain of the
school board, and courts do not interfere with the exercise of its
powers unless it is shown to be capricious or arbitrary.
27
In a vigorous dissent to the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Schaefer
criticized the statutory scheme which vested such wide powers in school
boards:
A legislative system which, as in this case, casts them in the
role of aggrieved the victims who formulate, prosecute and punish
charges based on their grievances is not, in my opinion, compatible
with present standards of due process.
28
It would appear, however, that Justice Schaefer's criticism is unsound.
Generally, with regard to administrative agencies, both the federal and
state case law reject the argument that the combination of adjudication
with prosecuting or investigating functions constitutes a denial of due
process. 29
It is an old common law maxim that one should not be the judge of
his own cause due to his inherent self-interest. On the administrative level,
however, it is common for an administrative agency to perform a variety
of functions including investigation, prosecution and adjudication. This
26 Id. at 577, 225 N.E.2d at 6.
27 Id. at 578, 225 N.E.2d at 7.
28 Id. at 585, 225 N.E.2d at 10.
29 See Davis, Administrative Law § 13.02, at 227 (1959).
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combination of functions has been tolerated as not violative of due process
largely for the practical reason that any separation of the functions would
require a complete change of the entire administrative system.
For example, to help insure fair hearings on the federal level, the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act,30 § 5 (c) provides for internal separation,
that is, while the agency itself performs all the aforementioned functions,
the subordinate agency personnel who act as deciders of a particular case
are to have no part in its investigation and prosecution.
Thus, it is quite clear that the principles adopted by the majority in
deciding the Pickering case conform to those postulated in the earlier de-
cisions. The courts are loath to interfere with the actions of local school
boards and will apparently do so only when they are convinced that a
school board has acted arbitrarily in a particular case. The court was unim-
pressed with the free speech argument which Pickering attempted to raise
and as such suggested that a teacher's freedom might, of necessity, have to
be compromised in favor of the broader social need of an efficient and
harmonious school system. As has so often been true, the court was con-
fronted with a situation wherein it had to resolve a clash between the
interests of the individual and those of the larger community. This writer
believes that the court correctly chose to protect the greater community
interest.
EDWARD A. HOFFMAN
HUSBAND AND WIFE-MARITAL RIGHTS-VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE OF
REAL PROPERTY BY EITHER PARTY TO A MARRIAGE CONTRACT WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER Is FRAUD AND CONVEYANCE WILL BE SET ASIDE AS
VOID. In Michna v. May, 80 Ill. App. 2d 281, 225 N.E.2d 391 (Ist Dist. 1967),
the Appellate Court for the First District of the State of Illinois was pre-
sented with the question of whether a voluntary conveyance of real property
by the prospective husband without knowledge of the prospective wife was
a fraud on the marital rights of the prospective wife. The court held the
conveyance was a fraud on the wife's marital rights and was without effect.
The plaintiff-widow was engaged to be married on December 19, 1955.
On January 10, 1956, her intended husband executed a land trust, whereby
the trustee held title to the real estate for the benefit of the grantor for life
and, on his death, the remainder would go to his sisters, the defendants.
The parties were married on January 23, 1956, and lived together until
May 6, 1961, when the husband died, leaving a will naming the plaintiff as
his sole beneficiary and executor. Upon learning of the trust agreement, the
plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to set the agreement aside on grounds of
30 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1946).
